Abstract-In this study, we propose an authentication mechanism with privacy protection for opportunistic networks. It is applied for the short-term and limited-time wireless network environment, and a super node is set to manage node registration.
INTRODUCTION
An opportumstlc network (OppNet) is a type of delay tolerant network that is composed of mobile and super nodes. An OppNet comprises the following features: In an OppNet environment, nodes are intermittently connected; there are no permanent source-destination end-to-end paths between nodes; disconnections and reconnections frequently occur between nodes; and the network connectivity is highly variable.
In an OppNet, all network topologies are variable. Adequate path-planning strategies must be implemented to prevent data loss and reduce interference. Moreover, node mobility enables OppNet to be applied in crisis management [2] , [7] . During data transmission, OppNets are connected through user device when the user is moving, thus completing message transmission. However, this transmission method is accompanied by the security problem of uncertainty during movements. For example, users may not be aware of whether randomly encountered nodes are secure and may be attacked when they encounter malicious nodes [8] , [9] . In addition, protecting users' personal privacy is another crucial concern. OppNet-related studies have mostly emphasized designing resource-efficient routing methods and have seldom focused on the protection of personal data and privacy. Therefore, the present study proposes an OppNet-specific authentication scheme for preventing malicious node attacks and protecting personal privacy.
II.

RELATED WORKS
Poonguzharselvi et al.
[1] proposed using trust value thresholds for selecting nodes and providing transmission services. Trust values between neighboring nodes are similar to trust levels between people. When transmitting data, a node individually calculates the trust values between itself and the remaining nodes to eliminate malicious nodes and increase the security of data transmission.
Goyal et al. [3] proposed placing seed nodes in OppNet environments to provide general node registration and store data. When source nodes connect to destination nodes, the connectivity must be reported by connecting to the seed node; moreover, virtual identifications (IDs) are transmitted from seed nodes to source nodes to obtain transmitted data from destination nodes. Furthermore, super nodes are used for managing user data and applying public and private key encryption techniques to general nodes to ensure data security.
Ren et al. [6] proposed a source anonymous message authentication scheme, which can anonymize destination node IDs, enable data transmission from source codes, prevent attackers from calculating destination nodes through tapping and tracing packet transmission paths, increase the security of data transmission, and protect destination IDs.
By using mobile devices and household and external proxies, Kuo et al. [10] proposed a registration and authentication scheme for ameliorating the challenges faced in controlling IDs in mobile devices, thereby providing protection against various forms of attacks.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME Figure I illustrates the network environment of the proposed scheme; each node is described subsequently. 1) Super Nodes: These are immobile nodes that are set within OppNets. When new nodes enter the network, they must register at the super nodes and obtain authentication credentials. When nodes require security confirmation, they may use the super nodes for verification.
2) Authenticated Nodes: These are nodes that have been authenticated by the super nodes and may represent users' mobile devices or equipment, such as tablets and laptop computers. 
A . Assumptions
The following assumptions were thus developed in this study:
1) Each user's mobile device that enters the network is considered an individual node. Each device possesses basic computation and storage abilities.
2) The OppNet adopts the local area network technology. Mobile network connections (i.e., 3G) are not discussed and secure channels are absent.
3) The mutual authentication and privacy protection of nodes were strictly emphasized and authenticated data transmission was excluded.
4) The OppNet refers to temporary gathering occasions. User registrations are processed at a service counter; super nodes are set at the service counter and nodes register at super nodes when they enter the area of proximity (less than 1 m).
5) Super nodes provide only authentication assistance, which excludes network message transmission, network topology, or transmission paths.
This study categorized the privacy types in the OppNet as user privacy and device privacy according to the privacy descriptions provided in related studies [4 ] , [5] . Table I lists the symbols used in this study.
B. Registration and Authentication Phases
In the network environment depicted in Figure I , the nodes are registered and authenticated at the super node when entering the network area. Therefore, the procedures in this study were divided into two stages, which are the registration Node A process and authentication process. These processes are described in the following subsections.
1) Registration Pr ocess: In this process, nodes register at the super node when they enter the network. Consider, for example, Node A; Figure 2 illustrates the procedures at the registration stage. a) Node A requests registration from the super node. When users register at the service counter with their handheld devices, a super node device is provided at the service counter for registration services.
b) The super node responds to the request and transmits PKs n . c) When Node A receives the response, it calculates h(lDeJ · d) Node A uses PK,n to encrypt PKu and returns h(IDeJ to the super node. e) When the super node receives the packet, a private key is used to unlock the packet, obtain and store PKa and h(IDu ), and generate M;. and Ts n . j) Subsequently, the super node uses the PKa encryption provided by Node A; this encryption comprises M;, the XOR value of h(IDeJ, operation functionf( ) of Node A, K,m and T, n . These data are then encrypted and returned to Node A. At this moment, the XOR operation provides authentication for only Node A to prevent risks of data leakage. g) When Node A receives the data, it operates using a private key and its own ID and obtains and stores M;J( ), and Ks n provided by the super node.
Super Node Node A seeks to transmit data to Node B; Node A may authenticate the ID of Node B and confirm whether Node B has completed the registration process at the super node. Figure 3 shows the authentication process, the procedures of which are elaborated as follows: a) First, Node A performs a hash operation on M.J and generates Ta. i) Node B uses SessKab' for the decryption; the session keys computed by the two nodes are equal if the encrypted messages can be unlocked. j) If the session keys vary, the connection terminates; otherwise, SessKab' is used to encrypt the returned connection reply. k) Node A uses SessKab to encrypt the connection request and connection reply. The session keys computed by both nodes are equal if these encrypted messages can be unlocked. Subsequently, data transmission may proceed between Nodes A and B.
The mutual authentication and node ID confirmation between users are completed in the aforementioned process.
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After this process, nodes may perform data transmission or trust evaluation (in combination with other studies). The proposed scheme for the authentication, privacy protection, and data transmission between nodes in OppNets is thus demonstrated in the aforementioned method.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the following discussion, privacy protection in OppNets and prevention against various security threats are analyzed.
A . Pr ivacy Pr otection
Regarding users' privacy protection, PKa and h(IDJ of Node A are transmitted when Node A registers at the super node (Step 4, Fig. 2) . During this process, the data stored in the super node are processed hash values, and plaintexts are not kept; therefore, this protects the super node from privacy leakage. In addition, super nodes strictly provide node registration within networks; network topology is not maintained. Therefore, user and node mobility are not recorded and their trajectories not traced, thereby eliminating any concern regarding location privacy. In addition to the IDs of hashed node devices, the data used in this study did not contain other user and device data, reducing the use of user data and indirectly preventing data leakage. Moreover, during each authentication transmission, the data packet for the authentication between each pair of nodes contained Ts and updated Ms. Therefore, each authentication uses different data, excluding equipment data. This prevents intentionally collecting node data and exposing node traces and improves the transmission privacy of users and privacy of mobile network equipment.
B. Tapping Attack
In the network environment, malicious attackers can tap and collect data, such as messages transmitted between devices and the super node during authentication processes. To prevent these processes, asymmetric public key encryption was used before message transmissions in the proposed scheme (Step 2, Fig. 3 ). Although malicious attackers can tap the transmitted messages when users use devices to register at the super node, the signals are encrypted ciphertexts; malicious attackers must have decryption keys to obtain the messages. Therefore, tapping attacks can be prevented in the proposed scheme. data cannot be unlocked. This confirms the hourly update of M and prevents repeated usage. Furthermore, although secure channels are absent during registration, nodes provide strictly their own public keys and ID hash values. Malicious nodes that present intentions to forge the super node and bait node data may obtain only the public keys and ID hash values, but are prevented from accessing other corresponding data to unlock packets. Therefore, the proposed scheme can prevent forgery attacks.
D . Resend Attack
In this scheme, Ts are generated when messages are transmitted between nodes (Step I, Fig. 3 ). User requests are declined when the node identifies expired timestamps. Therefore, attackers cannot repeatedly tap transmission messages and perform resend attacks.
E.
Man-in-the-middle Attack
In this attack technique, Ts are also added during message transmissions; moreover, asymmetric encryption is adopted.
Node A Because cracking is time-consuming in this scheme, message transmissions expire when attackers attempt to crack and tamper with message contents. Therefore, tampered messages cannot pass node authentication processes.
F. Anony mity
In this scheme, hashed IDs are used during node authentication; therefore, nodes cannot obtain the true IDs of other nodes to capture relevant device or user's privacy data. The XOR values of H(ID) and H( M) are adopted during message transmission and the symmetric key of the super node is used to encrypt transmissions. Consequently, malicious nodes cannot access the original message contents. The IDs of these nodes are immune to tracing; the connection records are also resistant to leakage. Therefore, the proposed scheme ensures the privacy of device and user data and the security of data transmission and storage. v.
CONCLUSION
This study proposes an improved authentication scheme based on previous complex computation processes; this scheme features enhanced privacy protection in OppNet environments. Results of the security analysis indicate that this scheme can stop tapping, forgery, and man-in-the-middle attacks and demonstrates superior security to other schemes. Regarding the functionality analysis, the proposed scheme exhibits comparatively fast and discrete protection to satisfy each of the aforementioned functions during message exchange processes between nodes. According to the performance analysis, more frequent message transmissions are required in the proposed scheme. However, the network environment of the proposed scheme is unsuitable for complex computations; therefore, increasing message transmission frequencies for reducing computational complexities is applicable for low-cost and energy-efficient devices
